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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
FOXTAIL PROPERTIES, LLC 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs, 
REECE GOODRICH, TRUSTEE; 
SHIRLEY ANN GOODRICH, TRUSTEE; 
REECE GOODRICH, 
SHIRLEY ANN GOODRICH; 
BOYD J. BROWN; 
MANUELA H. BROWN; 
JEROME H. MOONEY; 
BONNIE S. MOONEY; AND 
REMA, INC., 
Defendants/Appellees. 
CASE NO. 20031050 - CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARD OF REVIEW 
AND PRESERVATION BELOW 
a. Whether the District Court erred in granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that the 
continuing presence of Defendants' water pipes, water meter, 
vault, and manhole cover upon Plaintiff's land does not 
constitute a trespass when Defendants have failed to remove those 
utilities from Plaintiff's land after Plaintiff's written request 
to do so? 
Standard of review: A grant of summary judgment should 
be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The appellate court grants the trial court's 
legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Arnold Indus., Inc. v. 
Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below at 
R. 151-153, 211 (pp. 13-14). 
b. Whether the District Court erred granting Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that, even if 
Defendants' failure to remove their utilities from Plaintiff's 
land is a trespass, it is barred by the applicable three-year 
statute of limitations when: (i) Plaintiff filed the instant 
lawsuit less than one year after purchasing its property; and 
(ii) Defendants' had the consent of Plaintiff's predecessors in 
interest to use and maintain the utilities in their present 
location until the year 2000, less than three years prior to the 
commencement of this lawsuit? 
Standard of review: A grant of summary judgment should 
be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The appellate court grants the trial court's 
legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness. 
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In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Arnold Indus., Inc. v. 
Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below at 
R. 153-157, 211 (pp. 26-27, 33-34) . 
c. Whether the District Court erred in granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment without addressing 
Plaintiff's argument that Defendants' ongoing use of the 
utilities (as opposed to the mere presence of the utilities on 
Plaintiff's land) constitutes an actionable continuing trespass 
because it causes water to continually flow through pipes located 
on Plaintiff's property? 
Standard of review: A grant of summary judgment should 
be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The appellate court grants the trial court's 
legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Arnold Indus., Inc. v. 
Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below at 
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R. 152-53, 157, 211 (p. 12). 
d. Whether the District Court erred in granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that 
Defendants' have an easement by implication when: (i) one 
essential element of such an easement requires that the two 
parcels of land at issue were, at one time, owned by the same 
person or entity; and (ii) the undisputed facts before the 
District Court showed that the two adjacent parcels of land at 
issue in this case did not, at any relevant time, enjoy such 
unity of title? 
Standard of review: A grant of summary judgment should 
be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The appellate court grants the trial court's 
legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Arnold Indus., Inc. v. 
Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below at 
R. 158-160, 211 (pp. 34-36). 
e. Whether the District Court erred in granting 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment on the ground that 
Defendants' have an easement by implication when: (i) one 
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essential element of such an easement requires that the easement 
is reasonably necessary to the dominant estate; (ii) Defendants' 
acknowledged to the District Court that there may be alternative 
ways to provide culinary water to their property; and (iii) 
Defendants failed to offer any relevant evidence in support of 
their assertion that removal of the utilities would be 
prohibitively expensive? 
Standard of review: A grant of summary judgment 
should be affirmed only when there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law. The appellate court grants the trial court's 
legal conclusions no deference, reviewing them for correctness. 
In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, the facts and all 
reasonable inferences drawn therefrom are viewed in the light 
most favorable to the nonmoving party. Arnold Indus., Inc. v. 
Love, 63 P.3d 721, 725 (Utah 2002); Blue Cross & Blue Shield of 
Utah v. State, 779 P.2d 634, 636 (Utah 1989). 
Preservation Below: This issue was preserved below at 
R. 160, 211 (pp. 24-25, 36). 
5 
STATUTES, RULES, AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provision is of central importance to this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1) 
An action may be brought within three years: 
(1) for waste, or trespass upon or injury to real 
property; except that when waste or trespass is 
committed by means of underground works upon any mining 
claim, the cause of action does not accrue until the 
discovery by the aggrieved party of the facts 
constituting such waste or trespass; 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Plaintiff/Appellant Foxtail Properties, LLC appeals the 
District Court's grant of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Plaintiff brought this action against Defendants in 
October of 2002, seeking an injuction ordering Defendants to 
remove their water pipes, water meter, and vault from Plaintiff's 
property. R. 1-3. Defendants moved for Summary Judgment, 
arguing that: (i) Plaintiff have not stated a cognizable claim 
for trespass; (ii) Plaintiff's claim is time-barred; and (iii) 
Defendants' have an easement by implication, a complete defense 
to Plaintiff's claim for trespass. R. 138-140. After briefing 
and oral argument, the District Court, Judge Sheila K. McCleve, 
granted Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment and dismissed 
Plaintiff's Complaint. R. 195-203. This appeal followed. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
In the early 1970's, Jerome and Bonnie Mooney (the 
"Mooneys") and Boyd and Manuela Brown (the "Browns") developed 
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three apartment buildings on two adjacent parcels of land. R. 
119, 196. At the time of development, the Mooneys and the Browns 
owned an aggragate one-half interest in the northernmost parcel 
and the apartment building constructed thereon (hereinafter 
referred to as the ''Elizabeth House" or "Foxtail's" property). 
R. 120, 197. The other one-half interest in the Elizabeth House 
property was owned by Elizabeth Drinkhaus. R. 120, 197. Also at 
the time of development, the Mooneys and the Browns owned an 
aggragate two-thirds interest in the southernmost parcel and the 
two apartment buildings constructed thereon (hereinafter referred 
to as the "Victoria Canyon" or "Defendants'" property). R. 149-
50, , 162, 197. The other one-third interest in the Victoria 
Canyon property was owned by J.M. and Brenda Touw (the "Touws"). 
R. 149-50, 162, 197. 
During construction, a common connection to the water main, 
pipes, and an underground vault and water meter (hereinafter 
collectively referred to as the "utilities") were installed to 
serve all three apartment buildings. R. 120, 196-97. The 
utilities were installed primarily on the Elizabeth House side of 
the property line. R. 120, 197. 
In 1995, the Mooneys, the Browns, and DrinkhaUs conveyed 
their interest in the Elizabeth House property to City Creek 
Square, L.C. ("CSS"). R. 120, 197. Prior to this conveyance, 
Jerome Mooney informed Tom Felt, the managing member of CSS, that 
all three apartment buildings shared common water utilities, that 
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the utilities were located on the Elizabeth House property, and 
that the water costs for all three apartment buildings were 
charged to the owners of the Victoria Canyon property. R. 121, 
197. CSS eventually sold the Elizabeth House property in 2000. 
R. 121, 198. 
Plaintiff Foxtail Properties, LLC ("Foxtail") acquired the 
Elizabeth House property in 2002. R. 121, 198. As a condition 
of obtaining financing for the purchase of the Elizabeth House 
property, Foxtail was required to separate its water utilities 
from those serving Defendants7 property. R. 121-22, 198. 
Accordingly, Foxtail installed new water pipes, a new meter, and 
a new underground vault to serve only the Elizabeth House 
property. R. 122, 198. The old utilities remain and continue to 
serve Defendants' property. R. 122, 199. 
Shortly after purchasing the Elizabeth House property, 
Foxtail informed Defendants that the presence of their utilities 
on Foxtail's property constituted a trespass and requested, in 
writing, that they remove the utilities forthwith. R. 150, 163. 
When Defendants refused to comply, Foxtail filed the instant 
lawsuit, praying only for injunctive relief and requesting that 
the Court order the removal of the utilities from Foxtail's 
property. R. 122, 199. 
Defendants moved for Summary Judgment, and Judge McCleve of 
the Third District Court granted Defendants' motion and dismissed 
Foxtail's Complaint, concluding that i) the installation of the 
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utilities in the 1970's was not a trespass, (ii) the continued 
presence of the utilities on Foxtail's property is not a 
trespass, (iii) if the continued presence of the utilities on 
Foxtail's property were a trespass, it is a "permanent" trespass 
and Foxtail's claim is therefore barred by the three-year statute 
of limitations for trespass, (iv) Defendants have an easement by 
implication related to the utilities which is an absolute defense 
to Foxtail's claim of trespass, R. 195-203 (a copy of Judge 
McCleve's Order, Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law is 
attached hereto as Addendum A). Judge McCleve did not address 
Foxtail's additional argument that Defendants' continued use of 
the utilities, causing water to continually flow through 
Foxtail's property, is an actionable, continuing trespass. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In granting Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
District Court misapplied the law of trespass to conclude that 
the continuing presence of Defendants' utilities upon Foxtail's 
property does not constitute a trespass. uThe gist of an action 
of trespass is infringement on the right of possession." John 
Price Assoc, Inc. v. Utah State Conf., Bricklayers Locals Nos. 
1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 (Utah 1980) . Because the presence 
of Defendant's utilities upon Foxtail's property precludes 
Foxtail's use of that property for something else, it is clearly 
an uinfringement on the right of possession" and therefore 
constitutes a trespass. 
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The District Court also erroneously concluded that Foxtail's 
action for trespass, even if otherwise cognizable, is barred by 
the statute of limitations. The District Court concluded that 
the statute of limitations applicable to Foxtail's claim "expired 
sometime in the 1970s." R. However, because Foxtail's claim 
for trespass did not arise until it purchased the Elizabeth House 
property in 2002, the claim cannot now be barred by the three-
year statute of limitations. The District Court's conclusion 
leads to the absurd result that the statute of limitations 
expired even before it began. Furthermore, even if Foxtail's 
claim could have arisen prior to its purchase of the property in 
2002, it could not have arisen earlier than May of 2000, when 
Defendants lost the permission they previously enjoyed to 
maintain their utilities on Foxtail's property. Moreover, 
because Defendants continue to use the utilities, the trespass is 
continuing and therefore, not barred by the statute of 
limitations. The District Court failed to even address this 
argument. 
Finally, the District Court erred in concluding that 
Defendants are entitled to an easement by implication because 
Defendants failed to satisfy two essential elements of such an 
easement. First, an easement by implication requires that the 
two adjacent parcels of land enjoyed "unity of title" at the time 
the use for which the easement is claimed was first imposed upon 
the servient estate. See Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 
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(Utah Ct. App. 1989). However, the undisputed facts before the 
District Court showed that the two adjacent parcels of land at 
issue in this case did not, at any relevant time, enjoy such 
unity of title. Therefore, the District Court's conclusion that 
"there was unity of title sufficient to support an easement by 
implication" was erroneous. 
The District Court also erred in concluding that Defendants 
had satisfied the "necessity" element of an easement by 
implication. This element requires the party claiming the 
easement to prove that "the easement was reasonably necessary to 
the enjoyment of the dominant estate." Id., 774 P.2d at 1152. 
However, Defendants acknowledged to the District Court that there 
may be alternative ways to provide culinary water to their 
property, R. 129, and Defendants failed to offer any relevant 
evidence in support of their assertion that removal of the 
utilities would be prohibitively expensive. A mere assertion 
without evidence to support it is "wholly insufficient to support 
a summary judgment motion." Connor v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 972 
P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998). Therefore, the District Court erred 
in concluding that Defendants had satisfied the "necessity" 
element. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
FOXTAIL DOES NOT HAVE A COGNIZABLE CLAIM FOR TRESPASS. 
The first step in evaluating Foxtail's claim for trespass is 
to define the cause of action with reasonable specificity, 
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including all essential elements of the cause of action. 
Trespass has been defined variously by Utah Courts as "a 
possessory action . . . [t]he gist [of which] is infringement on 
the right of possession," John Price Assoc, Inc. v. Utah State 
Conf., Bricklayers Locals Nos. 1, 2 & 6, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 
(Utah 1980), and na wrongful entry . . . upon the lands of 
another." Holm v. B & M Service, Inc., 661 P.2d 951, 952 (Utah 
1983). Applying these broad definitions to the facts of this 
case, it is clear that the continued presence of Defendants' 
utilities on Foxtail's land constitutes a trespass. The 
utilities consist of pipes, a water meter, and an underground 
vault, all of which occupy space below the surfaces of Foxtail's 
land, as well as an unsightly manhole cover which occupies space 
in the middle of Foxtail's lawn. R. 120, 196-97, 211 (p. 21). 
As long as the utilities are occupying that space, Foxtail cannot 
use that land for any other purpose (e.g., planting a tree). 
Without a doubt, the presence of Defendant's utilities on 
Foxtail's property infringes on Foxtail's possession of that 
property and, therefore, constitutes a trespass. 
While the definitions above are helpful in identifying the 
general nature of the tort of trespass, however, they do not 
spell out its elements with specificity. In Walker Drug Co., 
Inc. v. La Sal Oil Co., 972 P.2d 1238, 1243 (Utah 1998) (Walker 
II), the Utah Supreme Court cited the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts, Section 158 in its attempt to define trespass. That 
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Section provides: 
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, 
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any 
legally protected interest of the other, if he 
intentionally 
(a) enters land in the possession of the other, or 
causes a thing or a third person to do so, or 
(b) remains on the land, or 
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he 
is under a duty to remove. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965). 
Under the Restatement definition, it is clear that the 
continued presence and use of Defendants' utilities on Foxtail's 
property constitutes a trespass. First, Defendants' failure to 
remove their utilities from Foxtail's property after being asked 
to do so clearly falls under subsection (c) of the Restatement 
definition. Moreover, by continuing to use the utilities located 
on Foxtail's property, Defendants are continuing to cause water 
to enter Foxtail's property in violation of subsection (a) of the 
Restatement definition. Therefore, Foxtail has stated a 
cognizable claim for trespass under both Utah case law and the 
Restatement definition. 
Defendants relied exclusively on Holm, 661 P.2d 951, in 
urging the District Court to define trespass simply as a 
"wrongful entry upon the lands of another." R. 122 (citing Holm 
at 952). Defendants argued that the continued presence and use 
of the utilities cannot constitute a trespass because the 
original installation of the utilities was a cooperative effort 
among all the owners at the time of development, and, therefore, 
13 
there was no "wrongful entry" upon Foxtail's property. R. 123. 
However, Defendants focus on the word "entry" is misguided. In 
Comment (b) to Section 158 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts, 
it is stated that: 
[T]he phrase "enters land," is for convenience used 
throughout the Restatement of this Subject to include, 
not only coming upon land, but also remaining on it, 
and, in addition, to include the presence upon the land 
of a third person or thing which the actor has caused 
to be or to remain there. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 cmt. (b) (1965). Similarly, 
the court in Holm used the phrase "wrongful entry" for 
convenience and did not intend to narrow the common law 
definition set forth in the Restatement. Therefore, this Court 
should not rely on the phrase "wrongful entry" as urged by 
Defendants. Rather, this Court should look to th€* common law 
definition of "trespass" set forth in the Restatement and quoted 
above. 
Nonetheless, even if this Court does adopt Defendants' 
definition of "trespass," it leads to the same conclusion that 
Foxtail has stated a cognizable claim. By continuing to use the 
utilities located on Foxtail's property, Defendants are causing 
water to flow through Foxtail's property without right or 
permission. Such use clearly constitutes a "wrongful entry" of 
water onto Foxtail's property. 
In concluding that Foxtail does not have a cognizable claim 
for trespass, the District Court adopted the Defendants' proposed 
definition, stating simply: "Trespass is defined as a xwrongful 
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entry upon the lands of another. "' R. 199. The District Court 
went on to conclude, without additional explanation: "The 
continued presence of the Utilities on Plaintiff's property is 
either not a trespass, or is, in the alternative, a 'permanent' 
trespass." R. 200. In reaching this conclusion, the District 
Court made no reference to either John Price, 615 P.2d 1210, 1214 
(trespass is "a possessory action . . . [t]he gist [of which] is 
infringement on the right of possession), or to the Restatement 
definition of trespass. The District Court's failure to properly 
define the tort of trespass lead it to erroneously conclude that 
the presence of Defendants' utilities on Foxtail's property was 
not a trespass. 
Moreover, the District Court utterly failed to address 
Foxtail's additional argument that Defendants' continued use of 
the utilities, causing water to flow through Foxtail's property, 
constitutes a trespass. If the tort of trespass is to be defined 
simply as a "wrongful entry," it is vital to evaluate Foxtail's 
claim that the use of the utilities, as opposed to the mere 
presence of the utilities, constitutes a trespass. In the 
hearing before the District Court on Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Foxtail's counsel stressed the importance of 
this distinction as follows: 
Now, it's important in analyzing Foxtail's claim here 
to keep in mind that there are really two bases for the 
claim of trespass. . . 
On the one hand, you have the pre--the actual, 
physical presence of the water mater on Foxtail's 
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property. And on the other hand, you have the 
defendants' continued use of that water meter and those 
pipes . . . [R. 211 p. 12] 
I think that the use of the water system, 
continued use of the water system is absolutely clearly 
a trespass. [R. 211 p. 18] 
Let me just identify a couple of key things that I'd 
like the Court to remember when you go back and when 
you read the memos. . . The first is that Foxtail has 
two bases for their claim of trespass; one is the pipes 
and one is the water. [R. 211 p. 29] 
Despite this reminder, the District Court failed to address this 
argument and entered no conclusions of law with respect to 
Defendants' continued use of the utilities. As explained above, 
water flowing through Foxtail's property without right or 
permission is a "wrongful entry" of water onto Foxtail's property 
and also meets the definition of trespass found in subsection (a) 
of the Restatement. See supra p. 12-13. Accordingly, the 
District Court erred granting Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment without considering Foxtail's argument that Defendants' 
ongoing use of the utilities constitutes a trespass. 
In short, the District Court erred in concluding that the 
presence of Defendants' utilities on Foxtail's property is not a 
trespass and erred further in failing to address Foxtail's 
argument that Defendant's continued use of the utilities is a 
trespass. Under both the John Price definition and the 
Restatement definition, the presence of the utilities on 
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Foxtail's property is a trespass. Under both the Holm definition 
and the Restatement definition, the Defendant's continued use of 
the utilities is a trespass. Accordingly, the District Court's 
conclusion that Foxtail has not stated a cognizable claim for 
trespass must be reversed. 
POINT II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
FOXTAIL'S CLAIM FOR TRESPASS IS BARRED BY THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS. 
The District Court erred in concluding that Foxtail's claim 
for trespass is barred by the three-year statute of limitations 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1). In reaching this 
conclusion, the District Court characterized the presence of the 
utilities on Foxtail's land as a "permanent" trespass, for which 
the statute of limitations period commenced at the time the 
utilities were installed in the 1970s. R. 200. Therefore, the 
District Court concluded, "an action for such trespass is now 
barred by the three year statute of limitations, which expired 
sometime in the 1970s. R. 200. The District Court erred on 
several fronts: (i) Foxtail's cause of action could not have 
accrued until it purchased the property in 2002 and, thus, the 
statute of limitations does not expire until 2005; (ii) even if 
Foxtail's cause of action accrued before it purchased the 
property, it could not have accrued before May of 2000 when 
Defendant's finally lost the permission they previously enjoyed 
to use and maintain the utilities in their present location; 
(iii) the presence of the utilities on Foxtail's property is an 
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encroachment and should therefore be characterized as 
xvcontinuing," not ^permanent"; and (iv) Defendants' continued use 
of the utilities is itself a trespass that should be 
characterized as ''continuing, " with each new use giving rise to a 
new cause of action. The District Court's conclusion leads to 
the absurd result that the statute of limitations period expired 
even before it began and this conclusion must therefore be 
reversed, 
A. FOXTAIL'S CAUSE OF ACTION FOR TRESPASS ACCRUED FOR 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PURPOSES AT THE TIME IT 
PURCHASED THE PROPERTY IN 2002. 
w[Al cause of action accrues 'upon the happening of the last 
event necessary to complete the cause of action.'" Hill v. 
Allred, 28 P.3d 1271, 1275 (Utah 2001) (quoting Myers v. 
McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah 1981). In other words, u[a] 
cause of action arises the moment an action may be maintained to 
enforce a legal right." Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374, 1379 (Utah 
1977). As Defendants recognize, nan action sounding in trespass 
cannot be maintained by one who did not have actual or 
constructive possession of the land at the time the alleged acts 
of trespass were committed." R. 122 (citing Wood v. Myrup, 681 
P.2d 1255, 1257 (Utah 1984)). In the present case, Foxtail did 
not have actual or constructive possession of the Elizabeth House 
property until it purchased that property in 2002. R. 199-200. 
Because Foxtail could not have maintained a trespass action 
against Defendants until that time, Foxtail's cause of action did 
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not accrue for statute of limitations purposes until then. See 
54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 210 (1987) ("a right of action 
concerning real property does not accrue, so as to affect the 
running of the statute of limitations, until the substantive 
right of plaintiff arises.") Consequently, Foxtail's claim 
cannot now be barred by the three-year statute of limitations. 
B. FOXTAIL'S CAUSE OF ACTION COULD NOT HAVE ACCRUED 
UNTIL MAY OF 2000 WHEN DEFENDANTS' LOST PERMISSION TO 
USE THE UTILITITES IN THEIR PRESENT LOCATION. 
Even if Foxtail's cause of action accrued before Foxtail 
purchased the Elizabeth House property, the claim could not have 
accrued earlier than May of 2000. Neither Foxtail nor Foxtail's 
predecessor in interest could have maintained a cause of action 
for trespass against Defendants as long as Defendants had 
permission to use and maintain their utilities on the property 
now belonging to Foxtail. In other words, as long as Defendants 
had such permission, their actions were not "wrongful" - an 
essential element of the tort of trespass. See Siegel v. Salt 
Lake County Cottonwood Sanitary Dist., 655 P.2d 662, 664 (Utah 
1982) (verbal grant of easement defeats claim of trespass because 
no "wrongful entry."); Ash, 572 P.2d at 1380 (the statute of 
limitations period does not begin to run nin an action for 
possession of land until the right of possession has been so 
challenged as to give rise to a cause of action."); see also 
Salisbury Livestock Co. v. Colorado Central Credit Union, 793 
P.2d 470, 475 (Wyo. 1990) (xx[c]onsent of the possessor or another 
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authorized to consent is an absolute defense to trespass."); 54 
C.J.S. Limitations of Actions § 210 (1987) ("A statute of 
limitations on actions for the recovery of real property or for 
the possession thereof is put in operation when plaintiff 
discovers defendant trespassing on the land and notifies him to 
cease."). Because the Defendants had permission to install and 
use the utilities at the time the properties were developed, no 
cause of action for trespass accrued at that time. As explained 
below, it would not be until May of 2000 that Defendants finally 
lost the permission they previously enjoyed to use and maintain 
their utilities on the Elizabeth House property. 
As Defendants noted, vxthe Browns and the Mooneys held an 
interest in both properties at the time of development, in the 
1970's, and continued to hold such an interest until 1995." R. 
128. Presumably, therefore, Defendants had permission to use the 
utilities until at least 1995, when they sold the Elizabeth House 
property to City Creek Square, L.L.C. ("CCS"). R. 120, 197. 
Therefore, no cause of action against Defendants for trespass 
accrued earlier than 1995. 
Upon its purchase of the Elizabeth House property in 1995, 
CCS also granted Defendants permission to use and maintain the 
utilities at their present location. Prior to CCS's purchase of 
the Elizabeth House property, Jerome Mooney told Tom Felt, 
managing member of CCS, that the utilities located at the 
Elizabeth House served both the Elizabeth House and Defendants' 
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property. R. 121, 197. Additionally, Mr. Mooney explained that 
the water bill for both properties would come to Defendants and 
that CCS would not be required to pay any portion of that bill. 
R. 144. Accordingly, as Defendants now acknowledge, "CCS 
acquiesced to this situation, and the presence of the water 
system . . . was therefore not a source of any complaint." R. 
128. CCS's acquiescence was tantamount to tacit consent to 
Defendants' continued use of the utilities. Indeed, CCS 
benefited immensly by granting that consent - CCS was never 
legally obligated to pay for any of the water used by the 
Elizabeth House. CCS sold the Elizabeth House in the year 2000. 
R. 121, 198. Consequently, Defendants had permission to use and 
maintain their utilities on the Elizabeth House property until 
2000. 
Because Defendants had such permission until the year 2000, 
a cause of action for trespass did not accrue until that time, at 
the earliest. Foxtail initiated this action in October of 2002, 
well within the three-year limitation period for trespass. R. 1. 
Therefore, even if Foxtail's cause of action accrued before it 
purchased the Elizabeth House property, the claim is not time-
barred. 
C. BOTH THE PRESENCE AND USE OF DEFENDANTS[ UTILITIES 
ON FOXTAIL'S PROPERTY ARE CONTINUING TRESPASSES, WITH 
EACH NEW USE OF THE UTILITIES GIVING RISE TO A NEW CAUSE 
OF ACTION. 
In determining when a cause of action for trespass accrues 
for statute-of-limitations purposes, it is first necessary to 
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characterize the trespass as either permanent or continuing. See 
Breiggar Properties, L.C. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 
1133, 1135-36 (Utah 2002); Walker Drug Co., Inc. v. La Sal Oil 
Co., 902 P.2d 1229, 1232 (Utah 1995) (Walker I). A "permanent" 
trespass (i.e., one that "will presumably continue indefinitely") 
accrues from the time the trespass is committed. Breiggar at 
1135 (quoting Walker I at 1232). A "continuing" trespass, in 
contrast, is characterized by either (i) a possibility that the 
trespass may be "discontinued at any time," or (ii) multiple acts 
of trespass giving rise to multiple causes of action. Id. 
(quoting Walker I at 1232). A continuing trespass may be 
challenged at any time and will never be barred by the statute of 
limitations prior to abatement. Id. In characterizing a 
trespass as permanent or continuing, courts look at the act 
constituting the trespass, not to the harm resulting from the 
act. Id. 
In the present case, Foxtail contends that there are two 
distinct bases for trespass liability: (i) Defendants' failure to 
remove the utilities from Foxtail's property after being asked to 
do so, and (ii) Defendants' continued use of the utilities 
without right or permission, causing water to continually flow 
through Foxtail's property. However, in concluding that any 
trespass occurring in this case is a permanent trespass, the 
District Court ignored both bases for liability put forth by 
Foxtail and erroneously identified the act of trespass as the 
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installation of the utilities at the time of development (this, 
despite Foxtail's concession below that the act of installing the 
utilities could not be a basis for liability, as that act was 
done with the knowledge and cooperation of all parties involved). 
R. 150. This is the specific error that lead the District Court 
to conclude that that the statute of limitations expired in the 
1970s - even before Foxtail purchased its property. R. 200. 
i. The District Court Erred in Characterizing 
the Presence of Defendants' Utilities on Foxtail's 
Property as a Permanent Trespass. 
As the Court in Breiggar directs, we must first identify the 
act constituting the trespass in determining if the trespass is 
permanent or continuing. Id. Here, the act constituting the 
trespass is less an overt act than inaction in the face of a 
duty. As explained above, Defendants' failure to remove its 
utilities from Foxtail's property after being asked to do so 
gives rise to liability for trespass under subsection (c) of the 
Restatement definition. See supra p. 12-13. To reiterate, that 
section provides: 
One is subject to liability to another for trespass, 
irrespective of whether he thereby causes harm to any 
legally protected interest of the other, if he 
intentionally 
(c) fails to remove from the land a thing which he 
is under a duty to remove. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 158 (1965). Similarly, the act 
of trespass (i.e., failing to remove the utilities from Foxtail's 
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property) is also the basis for liability under John Price, 615 
P.2d 1210, 1214 (trespass is ua possessory action . . . [t]he 
gist [of which] is infringement on the right of possession). 
Having identified the act of trespass as Defendants' failure 
to remove their utilities from Foxtail's property, it becomes 
clear that this "act" should be characterized as a continuing 
trespass. A "continuing" trespass is characterized by either (i) 
a possibility that the trespass may be "discontinued at any 
time," or (ii) multiple acts of trespass giving rise to multiple 
causes of action. Breiggar at 1135 (quoting Walker I at 1232) . 
First, it is certainly possible that Defendants would change 
their collective mind and decide to remove the utilities as 
Foxtail has requested. In this event, the trespass would be 
discontinued. Because there is a possibility that the trespass 
may be "discontinued at any time," the trespass should be 
characterized as continuing under option (i) above. 
Second, once you recognize that an omission in the face of a 
duty can constitute an act of trespass, you must also recognize 
that the omission recurs constantly so long as the actor fails to 
act. In other words, where the act of trespass is an omission, a 
new cause of action accrues every moment that the defendant fails 
to perform the required duty. In the present case, the act of 
trespass is Defendants' failure to remove their utilities from 
Foxtail's property. Every moment that Defendants fail to perform 
this duty gives rise to a new cause of action. Because there are 
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multiple acts of trespass giving rise to multiple causes of 
action, Defendants' failure to remove their utilities from 
Foxtail's property is a continuing trespass under option (ii) 
above as well. 
In Hoery v. U.S., 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2003) (en banc), the 
Colorado Supreme Court aptly explains this concept as follows: 
The typical trespass or nuisance is complete when it is 
committed; the cause of action accrues, and the statute 
of limitations begins to run at that time. But in 
cases, for example, when the defendant erects a 
structure or places something on or underneath the 
plaintiff's land, the defendant's invasion continues if 
he fails to stop the invasion and to remove the harmful 
condition. In such a case, there is a continuing tort 
so long as the offending object remains and continues 
to cause the plaintiff harm. See W. Page Keeton et 
al., Prosser and Keeton( on The Law of Torts § 13 (5th 
ed. 1984). 
In the context of trespass, an actor's failure to 
remove a thing tortuously placed on another's land is 
considered a "continuing trespass" for the entire time 
during which the thing is wrongfully on the land. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 161 cmt. b. Until the 
thing tortuously placed on the land, or underneath the 
land, is removed, then liability for trespass remains. 
See Am. Jur.2d Trespass § 26 (2002) . 
For continuing intrusions - either by way of 
trespass or nuisance - each repetition or continuance 
amounts to another wrong, giving rise to a new cause of 
action. . . . The practical significance of the 
continuing tort concept is that for statute of 
limitation purposes, the claim does not begin to accrue 
until the tortuous conduct has ceased. 
Id. at 218.x 
1
 The Utah Supreme Court apparently recognized this principle in 
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In characterizing the presence of Defendants7 utilities on 
Foxtail's property as a permanent trespass, the District Court 
relied solely on Breiggar. In that case, the Court held that the 
act of dumping debris onto the Plaintiff's property was the act 
of trespass triggering the running of the statute of limitations 
and that the fact that the pile of debris continued to remain on 
the Plaintiff's property was irrelevant. Breiggar, 52 P.3d at 
1136. The Court went on to characterize the act of dumping 
debris as a permanent trespass and held that the plaintiff's 
claim was time-barred because he filed his complaint more than 
three years later. Id. at 1136-37. 
In the present case, the District Court erroneously 
analogized the facts of this case to those of Breiggar, 
identifying the act of trespass as the installation of the 
utilities at the time of development, rather than Defendants' 
failure to remove the utilities after being asked to do so. 
Although some of Breiggar's language is helpful in determining 
when Foxtail's cause of action accrued for statut€*-of-limitations 
purposes, it is not helpful to analogize the facts of Breiggar to 
the facts of this case. The plaintiff in Breiggar did not argue 
Stevensen v. Goodson, 924 P.2d 339, 348 (Utah 1996) where it 
stated, "A cause of action based upon encroachment is of the 
nature of either a continuing trespass or a nuisance." 
26 
that the act of trespass was the defendants' failure to remove 
the debris after being asked to do so. Rather, it appears that 
all parties in Breiggar agreed that the act of trespass was the 
act of dumping debris. Consequently, Breiggar is silent as to 
whether the failure to remove the debris could have been a basis 
for trespass liability and as to whether that omission would have 
been characterized as permanent or continuing. Because Breiggar 
does not answer these questions, its holding in inapposite to the 
case at bar. 
ii. The District Court Erred in Failing to 
Characterize Defendants' Ongoing Use of the 
Utilities as a Continuing Trespass. 
Defendants' ongoing use of the utilities causing water to 
flow through Foxtail's property is another distinct basis for 
trespass liability that must be evaluated separately for statute-
of-limitations purposes. Here, the act of trespass is 
Defendants' ongoing use of the utilities. A new act of trespass 
occurs every time Defendants use their water. Because Defendants 
may discontinue their use of the utilities at any time and 
because there are multiple acts of trespass giving rise to 
multiple causes of action, it is clear that the District Court 
erred in failing to characterize these acts as a continuing 
trespass. See Breiggar, 52 P.3d at 1135. 
POINT III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
DEFENDANTS ARE ENTITLED TO AN EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION. 
The District Court correctly states the elements of an 
easement by implication as follows: 
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(1) that unity of title was followed by severance; (2) 
that the servitude was apparent, obvious, and visible 
at the time of severance; (3) that the easement was 
reasonably necessary to the enjoyment of the dominant 
estate; and (4) that the use of the easement was 
continuous rather than sporadic. 
R. 201 (citing Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150, 1152 (Utah Ct. App. 
1989). The existence of all these elements must "clearly appear 
in order to sustain an easement by implication.7' ^d. at 1153, 
n.l (quoting Orr v. Kirk, 224 P.2d 71, 73, 100 Cal. App.2d 678 
(1950) ) . In the instant case, the District Court erroneously 
concluded that Defendants satisfied their burden of proving the 
existence of all four necessary elements. However, the 
undisputed facts before the District Court established that the 
two adjacent parcels of land at issue in this case did not, at 
any relevant time, enjoy unity of title (element 1). Moreover, 
the District Court erroneously concluded that the claimed 
easement is reasonably necessary (element 3), despite Defendants' 
failure to present any relevant evidence to support this 
conclusion.2 Accordingly, this Court should reverse the District 
Court's conclusion that Defendants are entitled to an easement by 
implication. 
A. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT "THERE 
WAS UNITY OF TITLE SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT AN EASEMENT BY 
IMPLICATION." 
Although the District Court recognized that the two adjacent 
parcels at issue (Victoria Canyon and Elizabeth House) were not 
2
 Foxtail concedes that element 2 (apparent and visible) and 
element 4 (continuous use) have been satisfied. See R. 158* 
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entirely under common ownership at the time the utilities were 
installed, it nonetheless concluded that this partial "unity of 
title [was] sufficient to support an easement by implication." 
R. 201. At the time of development, the Browns, the Mooneys, and 
the Touws each owned a one-third interest in the Victoria Canyon 
properties. R. 149-50, 162, 197. Also at that time, the Browns 
and the Mooneys each owned a one-quarter interest in the 
Elizabeth House property while the remaining one-half interest 
was owned by Elizabeth Drinkaus. R. 120, 197. The Defendants 
argued before the District Court that, despite the different 
ownership of the two properties, "there was still a basic 
commonality of ownership between the two parcels because the 
Browns and the Mooneys held an interest in both properties." R. 
128. However, the Defendants fail to consider the relevant case 
law and, as a result, their conclusion and the conclusion of the 
District Court is simply wrong. 
Although Foxtail's counsel was unable to find any Utah cases 
on point, the question of what constitutes "unity of title" for 
purposes of an implied easement has been answered clearly by 
courts from other jurisdictions. In Farley v. Howard, 70 N.Y.S. 
51, aff'd 65 NE 1116 (App. Div. 1901), the court explained the 
century old rule that strict unity of title is required before an 
easement by implication can arise: 
The reason of the rule [requiring unity of title] is 
that a person who has absolute right to do just as he 
pleases with both lots has seen fit to impose upon one 
of them a burden for the benefit of the other. If both 
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are his, he can do as he likes with them; and if, for 
the sake of convenience, or of enhancing the value of 
one, he chooses to give to it an apparent and visible 
easement over the other, that is his business; and when 
he sells the dominant lot the purchaser has the right 
to assume that he buys everything that is apparent and 
visible, and therefore the easement. But that rule 
necessarily involves the proposition that the man 
creating the easement is the absolute owner of both 
lots, and has, therefore
 r the right to put upon either 
any incumbrance he likes. Quite clearly the rule fails 
in this case. Howard was the absolute owner of 32 
only. As to 34 he owned but a one-half interest. 
While he could do what he pleased with his undivided 
one-half interest in that lot, he could not impose upon 
Dumond's one-half interest any burden whatever. 
Id. at 53. The same is true in the instant case. Because the 
Browns and the Mooneys did not own all of the interest in the 
Elizabeth House property at the time the water system was 
installed, they could not burden Drinkhaus's one-half interest 
for the benefit of the Victoria Canyon properties.. In other 
words, because there was not unity of title at the time the 
utilities were installed, no easement by implication could arise. 
In the more recent case of U.S. v. Thompson, 272 F.Supp. 774 
(E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd 408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969), the court 
reached the same conclusion. In that case, the purported "common 
owner" of the three parcels at issue owned one parcel himself and 
partnership interests in the other two parcels. The court 
disagreed with the plaintiff's assertion that this ownership 
scheme "amounted to" a unity of title, stating: 
[Ujnity of title or ownership simply did not exist nor 
did there exist anything which "amounted to" such 
unity. The Court does not think that any such unity 
can be found in the mere fact that Mr. Thompson serves 
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as connecting links between the Summit House and his 
own property to the north and between the Summit House 
and the Shopping Center property to the south. He owns 
the fee of the property to the north; he owns 
partnership interests in the Summit House property and 
the Shopping Center property but the two partnerships 
are entirely different. There has never been any unity 
of possession or use of the three parcels of land. 
Id. at 785. In the instant case, Defendants claim that there was 
a "basic commonality of ownership" between the Victoria Canyon 
and the Elizabeth House properties. R. 128. However, just as 
the ownership scheme in Thompson did not ''amount to" unity of 
title, neither does the "basic commonality of ownership" in the 
case before this Court. 
B. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT 
DEFENDANTS SATISFIED THE "NECESSITY" ELEMENT OF AN 
EASEMENT BY IMPLICATION WHEN DEFENDANTS FAILED TO 
PRESENT ANY RELEVANT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THIS 
CONCLUSION. 
Although Defendants recognize that "there may be alternative 
ways to connect the Victoria Canyon buildings to the water main," 
R. 129 , the District Court erroneously concluded that "the 
removal of the Utilities . . . would entail a significant 
reconnection expense to Defendants," and therefore, that the 
claimed easement was reasonably necessary to the dominant estate. 
R. 201-202. However, Defendants failed to present any relevant 
evidence to support its assertion that the alternatives to the 
status quo would be prohibitively expensive. The only evidence 
cited by the District Court in support of its conclusion is the 
fact that Foxtail spent approximately $16,990 to separate its 
water supply from Defendants'. R. 202. However, Defendants 
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presented no evidence to suggest that Defendants would incur a 
similar expense to relocate its utilities onto its own property. 
In fact, the District Court record is devoid of any evidence 
whatsoever as to how much this might cost Defendants. 
Similarly, Defendants failed to present any evidence of the 
surrounding circumstances that might have helped the District 
Court determine the "reasonableness" of the necessity required to 
establish an easement by implication. The "necessity" element of 
an easement by implication is a "reasonable necessity" 
requirement. Butler at 1154, An inquiry into the 
"reasonableness" of the necessity requires a thorough 
consideration of the totality of the circumstances. As Foxtail's 
counsel explained to the District Court in the hearing on 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment: 
And in terms of necessity, it's a reasonable 
necessity standard. It's not a strict necessity 
standard, it's a reasonable necessity. In order to 
ascertain what is reasonable and what would be a 
reasonable expense to put the defendants to to fix this 
problem, you got to look at a lot of other factors that 
we don't have before us also. For example, you've got 
to look at the value of the building and the rental 
income from the building that they're talking about. 
If this is, say, a three or four million dollar 
building, is an expense of $20,000 unreasonable? 
Just to give you a comparison, if -- if the 
defendants had to re-roof that building, how much would 
it cost? Well, we don't know, but it's probably going 
to cost more than $20,000, probably more than the cost 
of putting a new water meter in, although we don't 
know, because we don't have that evidence before us. 
R. 211 p. 25. If Defendants had to re-roof their building at an 
expense of $20,000, would this expense be prohibitively expensive 
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so as to prevent Defendants from making the necessary repair? 
The amount of money Defendants have available to relocate their 
utilities would also be relevant in determining whether the 
expense of doing so would be unreasonable. However, Defendants 
failed to present any evidence to the District Court suggesting 
that they do not have sufficient funds available to relocate 
their utilities. 
Defendants bald assertion that the costs of relocating their 
utilities would be prohibitively expensive is without any factual 
basis in the record and therefore cannot support a grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Defendants. See Connor v. Union 
Pac. R.R. Co., 972 P.2d 414, 418 (Utah 1998) («[Defendant] fails 
to support this argument with an affidavit or any other evidence. 
Its argument is nothing more than a mere assertion, which is 
wholly insufficient to support a summary judgment motion."). 
Therefore, this Court should reverse the District Court's grant 
of summary judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only where there 
exists no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Utah R. Civ. P. 56. 
While the parties in the instant case do not disagree about the 
basic facts of the case, they disagree wildly about the legal 
conclusions to be drawn from those facts. As explained in the 
foregoing pages, Foxtail has set forth a cognizable claim for 
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trespass on the basis of Defendants' failure to remove its 
utilities from Foxtail's property and their continued use of 
those utilities causing water to continually flow through 
Foxtail's property. This claim is not barred by the statute of 
limitations for a variety of reasons, the most notable being that 
Foxtail could not have maintained an action for trespass against 
the Defendants until it purchased the Elizabeth House property in 
2002. Therefore, the statute of limitations did not begin to run 
until that time and this action was commenced later that the same 
year. Moreover, the purpose of the statute of limitation would 
not be furthered by affirming the District Court's conclusion 
that Foxtail's claim is time barred. "Statutes of limitations 
are intended to prevent unfair dilatory litigation." Vigos v. 
Mountainland Builders, Inc., 993 P.2d 207, 213 (Utah 2000). 
Foxtail certainly has not been dilatory in its pursuit of this 
claim - Foxtail filed its complaint less than one year after 
purchasing its property. Finally, the District Court's 
conclusion that Defendants ai€> entitled to an easement by 
implication must be reversed. The undisputed facts show that the 
two adjacent parcels at issue could not satisfy the "unity of 
title" element. Additionally, Defendants failed to present any 
relevant evidence supporting their assertion that the easement is 
reasonably necessary for the use of their property. For all the 
foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court should be 
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reversed. 
SUBMITTED this February 24, 2004. 
Davicf S. wKottl<gr 
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, DAVID S. KOTTLER, hereby certify that I have personally 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 450 South State Street, 5th Floor, P.O. Box 140230, Salt 
Lake City, Utah, 84114-0230, and two copies to the office J. 
Bruce Reading and William G. Wilson, SCALLEY & READING, P.C., 50 
South Main Street, Suite 950, P.O. Box 11429, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84147-0429, this ^ / d^Y of February, 2004. 
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Addendum A 
J. Bruce Reading #2700 
William G. Wilson #8787 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
50 South Main Street 
Suite 950 
P.O. Box 11429 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0429 
Telephoae: (801) 531-7870 
Facsimile: (801) 531-7968 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
FOXTAIL PROPERTIES, LLC, 
Plaintiff, 
V . 
REECE GOODRICH, TRUSTEE; SHIRLEY ANN 
GOODRICH, TRUSTEE; REECE GOODRICH; 
SHIRLEY ANN GOODRICH; BOYD J. BROWN; 
JEROME f-L MOONEY; BONNIE S. MOONEY; 
A N D R £ M A , I N C , 
Defendants. 
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS* 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
1 Case No. 020911345 
| Judge Sheik K, McCleve 
The above-entitled matter came before the Court pursuant to a Motion for Summary 
Judgment (the "Motion") filed by Defendants Reece Goodrich, Shirley Ann Goodrich, Boyd J. 
Brown; and REMA, Inc. (hereinafter, 'Defendants**) on or about June 10,2003. 
In their Motion for Summary Judgment, Defendants requested that the Court find aod 
conclude that: (1) the existence of underground utilities (hereinafter, the "Utilities") on Plaintiff 
Foxtail Properties, LLC's property, which serve Defendants* adjacent property, do not constitute 
f i s iiSTii c? earn 
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a trespass; and (2) that Defendants are entitled to an implied easement relating to said Utilities. 
The Court, having studied the memoranda and other materials submitted by both Plaintiff and 
Defendant, having considered oral arguments of counsel, and being thus fully advised in the 
premises, hereby enters the following Stipulated and Undisputed Facts, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order: 
STIPULATED AND UNDISPUTED FACTS 
L In the early 1970s, Defendants Jerome £L and Bonnie S. Mooney (the "Mooneys"), 
together with Boyd J. Brown and his wife (the "Browns") developed three apartment 
buildings on two adjacent parcels of real property on North Canyon Road in Salt Lake 
City. 
2. On the northernmost parcel* the Mooneys and Browns built an apartment building known 
as "Elizabeth House." This parcel will be referred to hereafter as either the Elizabeth 
House property** or the "Plaintiff* s property." 
3. On the adjacent parcel to the south, the Mooneys and Browns built two apartment 
buildings known as "Victoria Canyon North" and "Victoria Canyon South/* This parcel 
will hereafter be referred to as either the "Victoria Canyon property" or "Defendants' 
property/* 
4. When the Elizabeth House and Victoria Canyon properties were developed, a common 
connection to the water main, pipes, and an underground vault and water meter 
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(sometimes referred to hereafter as the "Utilities**) were installed to serve both properties. 
5. The Utilities were installed primarily on the Elizabeth House side of the property line. 
6. The Utilities have been in place and has been used continuously since the early 1970s. 
7. The Utilities which pass through Foxtail's property provide culinary water to the Victoria 
Canyon apartment buildings. 
8. At the time of development, the MooneysT as joint tenants7 and the Browns, as joint 
tenants, owned an aggregate 2/3 interest in the Victoria Canyons properties, and the 
remaining 1/3 was owned by JLM and Brenda K. Touw. 
9. Also at the time of development, the Mooneys^ as joint tenants* held title to an undivided 
one quarter interest in the Elizabeth House property, and the Browns held the same type 
of interest; the other undivided one half interest in the Elizabeth House property was held 
by Elizabeth Buell Drinkhaus ("Brinkhaus"). 
10* In 1995, the Mooneys, the Browns, dmi Drinkhaus conveyed their interest in the Elizabeth 
House property to City Creek Square, L C ("CSS"). 
11. Prior to the conveyance, Jerome Mooney informed Tom Felt, the managing member of 
CSS, that the Victoria Canyon property and the Elizabeth House Property shared 
common Utilities and meter; that the Utilities were on the Elizabeth House property; and 
that water costs for both properties were always charged to the owners of the Victoria 
Canyon property. 
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12. Tom Felt determined, prior to CSS's purchase, that CSS would have no liability for the 
Victoria Canyon property water bill, even though the bill reflected the Elizabeth House 
property's water use. 
13. CSS therefore bought the Elizabeth House property knowing that the Utilities were 
primarily on the Elizabeth House side of the property line, and of the Browns' and 
Mooneys" use of the Utilities on its property. 
14. The Browns, as joint tenants, still retain a partial interest in the Victoria Canyons 
property. 
15. The Mooneys sold their interest in the Victoria Canyons properties prior to Foxtaifs 
acquisition of the Elizabeth House property. 
16. CSS eventually sold the Elizabeth House property to Chrysalis, a limited partnership, in 
the year 2000. 
17. Foxtail, Plaintiff heiein, subsequently acquired the Elizabeth House property from third 
parties in approximately September of 2002. 
18. As a condition of obtaining financing for the purchase of the Elizabeth House property,, 
Foxtail was required to sever the Elizabeth House property's connection to the shared 
Utilities, and to install a separate meter* 
19. After expending approximately $16,990.00 on the installation of a separate water supply 
and meter for the Elizabeth House property, David Kottler, of Foxtail, requested that the 
4 
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owners of the Victoria Canyons property pay two thirds of the cost. 
20. Upon Defendants' refusal to share in the costs, Foxtail filed the instant lawsuit, claiming 
that the Utilities serving the Victoria Canyon property are a trespass. 
21. Foxtail has prayed only for injunctive relief, requesting that the Court order the removal 
of the Utilities from Foxtail's property. 
22. Foxtail has claimed no damages relating to the alleged trespass. 
23. Defendants* use of the Utilities on Foxtail's property has been continuous since the 
1970s, long before severance of the Browns' and the Mooneys* common ownership of the 
Victoria Canyon and Elizabeth House properties in 1995. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Court concludes that: 
L The installation of the Utilities in the 1970s was not a trespass. Trespass is defined as a 
"wrongful entry upon the lands of another." See Woodv, Myrup, 681 P.2d 1255,1257 
(Utah 1984). When the pipes, meter, and vault were installed^ both the Elizabeth House 
and Victoria Canyon properties properties were being developed by the Browns and the 
Mooneys, as common owners, with the cooperation of other owners. The installation of 
the shared Utilities was thus a cooperative effort by both joint owners and others who had 
an interest in the two properties, The installation could not constitute a "wrongful entry 
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upon the lands of another" because it was by consent of all the interested landowners. 
2. Because Foxtail did not have actual or constructive possession of the land at the time the 
installation occurred, it cannot maintain a cause of action based upon the installation. An 
action sounding in trespass cannot be maintained by erne who did not have actual or 
constructive possession of the land at the time the alleged acts of trespass were 
committed. See Holm v. B.&M. Servs^ 661 R2d 951,952 (Utah 1983). 
3. The continued presence of the Utilties on Plaintiffs property is either not a trespass, or is, 
in the alternative, a "permanent" trespass. Under Utah law, a trespass is either permanent 
or continuing. See Breiggar Properties, LC. v. H.E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 1133 
(Utah 2002), "Where a nuisance or trespass is of such character that it will presumably 
continue indefinitely* it is considered permanent, and the limitations period runs from the 
time the nuisance or trespass is created." See Breiggar, 52 P.3d at 1135. From the time 
it was installed, in the 1970s, as a permanent fixture of the land, the Utilities were of such 
a character that their existence would "presumably continue indefinitely." Therefore, 
even if the Utilities could somehow constitute a trespass, an action for such trespass is 
now barred by the three year statute of limitations, which expired sometime in the 1970s. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-26(1). 
4. Defendants have demonstrated the elements of an easement by implication related to the 
Utilities. Defendants* showing of their entitlement to an implied easement on Foxtail's 
6 
property is an absolute defense to Foxtail's claim of trespass. Under Utah IawT the 
elements necessary to establish an easement by implication aie: (1) unity of title followed 
by severance; (2) apparent, obvious, or visible servitude at the time of severance; (3) the 
easement f s reasonable necessary to the dominant estate; and (4) the use of the easement 
was continuous. See Butler v. Lee, 774 P.2d 1150,1152 (Utah C t App. 1989). 
Unity of title is evident because both Foxtail's property and Defendants* property were 
originally owned in common by, and developed byr the Browns and the Mooneys. The 
Browns and the Mooneys shared an interest in the Elizabeth House with Elizabeth Buell 
Drinkhaus ("Drinkhaus"), and in the Victoria Canyon Apaitments with JJML and Brenda 
K. Touw. Because the Mooneys and the Browns owned undivided interests in both 
parcels up to the time of severance, there was unity of title sufficient to support an 
easement by implication. 
The servitude was obvious when unity of title was severed, in 1995, and the Elizabeth 
House property was sold to CSS. Prior to CSS*s purchase of Elizabeth House from the 
Browns* the Mooneys, and Drinkhaus, Jerome Mooney explained to CSS's principal^ 
Tom Felt, that the water connection to the City main, the meter, and the pipes were all on 
the Elizabeth House side of the property line. 
The easement under dispute is reasonably necessary for the dominant estate, as required 
by the third element of m easement by implication. The Utilities on Foxtail's property 
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provide culinary water to the Victoria Canyon apartment buildings. Without a connection 
to the water main, the Victoria Canyon apartments would be uninhabitable. Moreover, 
the removal of the Utilities from Plaintiffs property, even if feasible, would not come at 
"little or no cost" to Defendant Plaintiff expended approximately $16,990.00 to install 
new utilities on its property. It is thus apparent to the Court that the removal of the 
Utilities, as prayed for in the Complaint, would entail a significant reconnection expense 
to Defendants. 
The use of the Utilities was continuous. Victoria Canyon North and Elizabeth House 
were developed together in the early 1970s. At that time, the Utilities were installed. The 
same system was in place and used continuously until Foxtail disconnected it as a source 
of water for Elizabeth House, in 2002, and provided for a separate meter and water 
connection to Elizabeth House-
In summary, Foxtail has failed to state a cause of action for trespass because Foxtail did 
not own the property at the time the Utilities were installed, and because the nature of the 
trespass, if any, is permanent and now barred by the statute of limitations. Moreover,, 
Defendants have demonstrated that the elements of an implied easement on the Foxtail 
property are fulfilled. 
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ORDER 
For the foregoing reasons, all causes of action contained in Plaintiff's Complaint are 
hereby dismissed with prejudice. 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
D a W s . Kottler \ ' * v - ^ ~ -
Attorney for Foxtail Properties, LLC 
